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of the bidding firms. The goal of this article is to characterize the optimal mechanism in such a 
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1 Introduction 
In December 1994 the Spanish Ministry oí Public Works awarded the second íranchise in mobile 
telephone service to the Airtel groupl. The Airtel bid (85 billion ptas.) \Vas 4 billion ptas. lower 
than rival Cometa-SMR's offer. The Ministry argued that the difference in price was compensated 
by the difference in quality between the two bidders.2 • 
This kind oí procurement contract where bidding firms are oí different levels oí quality is 
awarded by a mechanism we will in the íol1owing cal1 contesf3. In this mechanism the contracting 
board jointly evaluates both price and quality. The goal oí this artic1e is to define the íeatures that 
a contest should have to be the optimal mechanism in procurement contract where the bidding 
firms have different levels oí quality. In others words, we want to study how a contracting board 
should jointly evaluate the price and quality . 
The State Contract Law regulates the procurement contract awarded by the Spanish Adminis-
tration. According to the Law there are three admissible procurement mechanisms: the auction, 
the negotiation proceduré and the contest. 
• The auction ranks the bids only according to the price and the law recommends its use 
whenever possible. 
• The negotiation procedure is the most subjective oí the three mechanisms: The Adminis-
tration can award the contract to bids with the highest prices and even avoid making the 
decision publico Since the negotiation procedure is the most manipulable mechanism , the 
law limits its use to urgent projects, smal1 projects, projects related to the national deíense, 
lEl Pais (December 29,1994) 
2There are many dimensions in this procurement contract: the technical capacity, comercial strategy, economic 
and finalcial solvency, employment, etc. 
3In Spanish, concurso. 
4called "adjudicación directa" by the previous law 
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etc. 
• Finally, the contest mechanism is used when other features from the bids along with price 
have to be taken into account. 
The law allows that the use of both the auction and the contest be restricted, thus they are 
previous admission mechanisms. In this artiele, besides studying the features of the contest, we 
analyze how the auction and the previous admission auction work, since these mechanisms are 
frequently used by the Administration. 
As an important deregulation of the telecommunication sector is going to take place in Spain, 
it seems also important to study contract procurement mechanism when the bidding firms have 
different levels of observable quality. This process will involve many procurement auctions similar 
to the one mentioned aboye, like, for example, the one that will take place for cable television 
franchises. 
Other important applications inelude the regulation of the electric sector: the last reform of the 
electric sector established that new power stations will be awarded by contest. Although electricity 
is a homogeneous good, power stations can produce it with different technologies, and the impact 
on the environment need not be the same. Thus, in this kind of procurement, quality could be 
measured by the impact of the technology on the environment as well as other important feature 
like the availability of power at different times of the day. 
The literature on the relationship between procurement mechanism when goods have different 
qualities is relatively scarce. Thiel (1988) studies the design of the optimal auctions when bidding 
firms can produce goods of different quality at ~ifferent costs. To simplify matters Thiel (1988) 
assumes that a previous decision about the price is made. With this assumption the problem is 
analogous to designing a unidimensional auction. Branco (1992) and Che (1993) analyze the design 
of multidimensional auctions in which the firms compete in price and quality. Rogerson (1990) 
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investigates the decision-making process of government agencies with respect to procurement and 
its consequences on the quality of the purchased good. Manelli and Vicent (1994, 1995) seek the 
optimal mechanism when information on quality is private and there is a direct correlation between 
cost and quaity but quality is not verifiable in a court oflaw. Cripps and Ireland (1994) consider 
a model in which quality is an unknown condition in order to approve the project and analyze 
how three specific mechanisms perform in this situation, while not characterizing the optimal 
mechanism. Laffont and Tirole (1991) assume like the present paper that firms have different 
quality levels and no relationship exists between quality and costo They first study the optimum 
auction when the information on quality is public and subsequentIy analyze the problem of collusion 
between the firms and the agent who awards the project when the information on quality is private 
(it is known only to the agent and the firm). Their result is that in the optimal auction the principal 
(Administration) has to undervalue quality. Since Laffont and Tirole (1991) consider a very stylized 
situation with two firms that can only have two different possible cost and two quality levels, this 
paper aims at providing a more general result that will support reliable normative conc1usions. 
McAfee and McMillan (1989) and Branco (1994) study auctions with foreign bidders, but their 
structures and their results are related with our problem. In their models, firms have a public 
feature -nationality- that either has value per se or is associated with information about the 
firm's technology. This allows the possibility to design an auction with favoritism for foreign or 
domestic firms. McAfee and McMillan (1989) show how to discriminate in favor ofthe firm with the 
worst technology can stimulate competition, while Branco (1994) justifies discrimination in favor 
of domestic firms since their profits have a positive effect on the national welfare (consumption, 
employment, etc.). In the present paper the Administration will use different observable quality 
levels to discriminate among firms. It will be shown that while it is natural that firms with higher 
quality should have a higher probability to be awarded the contract, the probability with which 
low quality firms will be awarded the contract has very important implications in order to maintain 
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competition. The ultimate goal of the paper is to provide an optimal compromise between quality 
and price. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is introduced. Section 3 analyzes the 
auction and the previous admission auction which are often used. Section 4 identifies the optimal 
mechanism and discusses its features: the main result is that the optimal mechanism urdervalues 
quality, and therefore low quality firms are awarded the contract more often that it would be 
efficient. Section 5 concludes the papero 
The Model 
An Administration wants to undertake a single indivisible project (for example, the construction of 
a bridge) that generates social value V(Q), an increasing function of Q, the quality of the project, 
V'(Q) > O. The welfare function of the Administration is the difference between the social value 
of the project and its price, W = V(Q) - P. The Administration is interested in finding the 
mechanism that maximizes its expected welfare function. 
Suppose there are N firms that are capable of undertaking the project and that each firm has an 
observable quality level Qi. The Administration knows the identity of each individual firm and their 
quality levels; let firms be indexed according to decreasing quality levels, Q1 > Q2 > ... > QN. 
Firm i has private cost Ci of completing the project. The cost Ci is independently distributed 
according to the distribution function F(c) on [c*, c*]. The distribution function F( c) satisfies the 
monotone hazard rate assumption fe [~t~n > O. Each firm knows its own cost Ci, the number of 
bidders N, the quality of each firm, and F(c). The Administration knows the number of bidders N, 
the quality of each firm, and F(c) but does not know individual costs Ci, Le., there is asymmetric 
information about costs. We will assume that firms are risk neutral, that there is no re/ation between 
the cost Ci and the level of quality Qi and that the Administration always wants to undertake the 
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project as its social value with the lowest quality is larger than the highest cost V(QN) > c... 
Procurement proceeds in three steps. The Administration first announces the mechanism that 
it is going to use; in the second stage each firm submits a bid; final1y the Administration awards 
the project5 • 
3 Auction and Previous Admission Auction 
3.1 Auction 
In a regular auction bids only specify a price. We will now consider first price sealed-bid auctions 
(FPSB)6, where the firm with the lowest bid wins the contract and pays its bid (the contract price 
is therefore the lowest bid price). The next Proposition characterizes the bidding equilibrium and 
the expected contract price. 
Proposition 1 In a first price sealed-bid auction (FPSB), with N risk neutral firms, with private 
cost Ci distributed according to cumulative distribution function F( c) and with each firm knowing 
its cost Ci, N, and F( c): 
... . . f' [1-F(c)]N-1dc 
1. The equtlzbrzum bzd for a firm of cost Ci zs Pi = Ci + '¡l-F(c.)]N 1 
2. The firm with lowest cost who wins the auction. 
3. The expected contraet price is P(N) = f::(c+ F(c))N[l- F(c)]N-lf(c)dc. 
Proof: See McAfee and McMillan(1987) 
5The three stages are caBed in Spanish respective1y, licitación, puja and adjudicación. 
6With the assumptions oí the model the contract price does not depend on the class oí auction. 
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Asa consequence the expected contract price is decreasing in the number of firms P'(N) < 0;7 
since aH firms have the same probability of winning the auction, irrespective of their quality levels, 
the expected quality of the project is Qs = L:f::l Q¡fN which is simply the average of quality 
of aH firms participating in the auction; finally, the Administration's expected welfare is Ws = 
L:f::l V(Q¡)/N - P(N). 
3.2 Previous Admission Auction 
The Spanish Administration often uses the previous admission auction (PAA) to award projects. 
In PAA's firms can only take part if they fulfil sorne requirements, such as solvency, experience, 
etc. This kind of requirements will be expressed in our model by a minimum quality level Q. 
The Administration sets a minimum quality level and the firms can take part in the auction only 
if they a quality level no lower than the preset standard. The PAA is obviously a more general 
mechanism than the FPSB auction, as the FPSB auction is a special case of previous admission 
auction in which the minimum quality requirement does not prevent the entry of any firm (in our 
model Q ~ QN). 
Let N"( Q) be the number of the firms with a quality level higher that the minimum Q (N"(Q) 
is obviously non-increasing in Q). The contract price that foHows from Proposition 1 is P(N"(Q)) 
and the expected quality is QPA(Q) = L:f:.?') Q¡fN"(Q). An increase in the minimum quality 
requirement to enter the auction implies an expected quality increase but also an increase in the 
expected contract price as a consequence of the lower number of firms participating in the auction. 
¿N·(Q) 
The Administration's expected welfare will be WPA =i-}.¡.(~(Qi) - P(N"(Q)). Expected quality 
and price of the PAA are no lower than those of the FPSB auction, but expected welfare of the 
PAA with an optimum minimum quality requirement is never lower than the FPSB auction's as the 
1Since the FPSB auction is equivalent in expected terms to a second price sealed bid auction, the expected contract 
price will be the second lowest value of cost in a sample of size N from F(e). It is then simple to check that the 
expected contract price is decreasing in the number of firms P'(N) < o. 
6 
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former is a more general mechanism than the latter (it would be equal if Q* ~ QN, and it cannot 
be lower with an optimum minimum quality requirement, Q*). 
The optimum minimum quality is found as the solution of a simple maximization problem: 
- {L~·(Q) V(Q¡) - }
Q* E argmax t=~*(Q) - P(N*(Q)) 
The Administration often uses both PAA and FPSB auction, although they are not optimum 
mechanisms. Due explanation stems from the fact that the mechanisms are simple to apply and 
they are more difficult to manipulate than the contest thereby avoiding corruption problems8 . 
The Optimal Mechanism 
As we said in the introduction the contest is a procurement mechanism that takes into account 
the price as well as other features of the bid that in our model will be summarized by a quality 
component. Our objective is to characterize the contest as an optimal mechanism and with this goal 
in mind we address the problem using the methods developed by Myerson (1981) on the optimal 
design of auctions. 
Our problem is similar to Branco (1994). This paper analyzes how a project is awarded to one 
of two firms, one of them domestic and the other foreign. The main feature of the model is that the 
regulator is interested in maximizing the home country expected welfare. This objective function 
generates an asymmetry between the firms, because if the foreign firm gets the contract, its profit 
is not relevant for domestic welfare. If the domestic firm gets the contract, on the other hand, the 
regulator adds to the project's value the domesti.c firm's profit. A c1ear relationship between this 
work and our study exists as the domestic firm can be thought of as a firm of higher quality, which 
if awarded the project will provide higher value. In Branco's optimal mechanism, the regulator 
8See, e.g. Laffont and Tirole (1991). 
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discriminates in favor of the domestic firm and we can therefore expect the solution to our problem 
to share have the same features, though in our case the Administration is going to discriminate 
according to the quality level of the firms. 
We design a mechanism with two variables {Pi(Ci,Qi),Xi(C,Q)}, Q and C being the quality 
and cost vectors, respectively, and Pi is the expected payment made to the firm i; as is clear, the 
expected payment is conditional only on the own cost and quality, while Xi E [0,1], the probability 
of awarding the project to firm i depends on the whole vector of costs and quality levels. The type 
of each firm is given by its cost and its quality level, but as the latter is public information, we 
simplify the notation by omitting it {Pi(Ci,Qi), Xi(C, Q)} = {P¡(C¡),Xi(C)}, 
We are going to use a revelation mechanism in three steps. First the Administration announces 
the mechanism that it is going to use {pi(Ci),Xi(C)}. The second step is the bidding stage, in which 
the use of a revelation mechanism ensures that firms report their own true costs. Finally, the 
Administration awards the project and makes payments. 
We want to find a revelation mechanism that maximizes the ex-ante welfare of the Adminis-
tration. Following the revelation principIe (Myerson (1979)), there is no loss of generality if we 
concentrate on revelation mechanisms. Moreover, we restrict ourselves to mechanisms that satisfy 
incentive compatibility. This condition in our setting is the following: 
where, 7r(c',c) = P¡(c') - C¡X¡(C',C_i). According to the above condition a revelation mechanism is 
incentive compatible if all firms, no matter what their cost and quality, are willing to report their 
cost truthfully, Le., all firms maximize their profits by reporting their true cost .parameter. The 
mechanism must also satisfy other constraints on the probability of awarding the project, because 
the Administration only awards one project. 
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LXi::; 1, X¡ ~ O VCi E [c., c·], Vi E N 
i=l 
Finally, we also want to guarantee that all firms taking part in the mechanism get greater or equal 
profits than simply staying out. This restriction is called the individual rationality constraint. 
E C_¡{1l"(Ci,C)} ~ O VCi E [C., c·], Vi E N 
If a mechanisms satisfies the three conditions above (incentive compatibility, individual ratio-
nality and the constraint on the probabilities) we call it a feasible mechanism. Then our problem 
is to find the feasible mechanism {P¡( Ci), X¡( c)} that maximizes the expected welfare of the Admin-
istration. 
maxp(c),x(c) E [¿:f::l V(Qi)X¡ - ¿:f::l Pi] 
s.t. EC_¡{1l"(Ci,C)} ~ O, VCi E [c., c·], Vi E N 
EC_¡{1l"(Ci,C)} ~ Ec_¡{1l"(C',c)}, VCi,C' E [C., c·], Vi E N 
VC¡ E [c., c·], Vi E N 
The solution to this problem is characterized by the following result: 
Proposition 2 The firm that wins is the one whose cost and quality level maximize the function 
'l/J(Q,c) = V(Q) - c - ~f~5' Then Xi = 1 if and only if 'l/J(Qi,Ci) = maXj 'l/J(Qj,Cj). The payment 
to the winning firm (contract price) will be the maximum cost, with which the winner firm would 
have obtained the project. lf i is the winner and i· is the second best firm i, 'l/J(Q¡-, Ci-) ~ 'l/J(Qj, Cj), 
Vj f:. i, the contract price is: 
c. if 'l/J(Qi,C·) ~ 'l/J(Qi-,Ci-) 
Pi= { cf'! : 'l/J( Qi, cf'!) = 'l/J(Qi-, Ci-) if 'l/J(Qi,C·) < 'l/J(Qi-,Ci-) 
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Proof: See Appendix A. 
As we said at the beginning of this section, the optimal mechanism is similar to Branco's. 
The optimal mechanism is an auction with favoritism: even though aH firms can take part in the 
procurement process, the greater quality of the firm has, the higher probability that it will be 
awarded the contracto Therefore, the expected quality of the project is higher when the project is 
awarded by contest than when it is awarded by a FPSB auction. The contest's expected quality is 
an average of participating firms' qualities with weights decreasing with quality: 
N N 
Qc = ¿ OiQi with i > j ~ Oi ~ Oj and ¿Oi = 1 
1 1 
The contest 's expected price is higher than the auction 's expected price. This can be better 
understood thinking that if the Administration did not care about quality and would only be 
interested in minimizing the price, then the optimal mechanism is equivalent to a FPSB auction 9. 
The comparison between the contest and the PAA is ambiguous. We know the PAA is weakly 
dominated by the contest, but we can not say anything about the quality and price. The problem 
is that expected price and quality of the PAA depends on the minimum quality Q 10. 
The next proposition summarizes the main features of the optimal mechanism. 
Proposition 3 The optimal mechanism undervalues the quality with respect to what would be 
efficíent with perfect information. 
Proof: Consider two firms with different levels of quality Qj < Qi, but the same evaluation 
according to the optimal mechanism 1f;(Qi,Ci) = 1f;(Qj,Cj). Using the monotone hazard rate as-
9Even though the contest's expected price is higher than auction's expected price, sometimes thecontest's price is 
lower than the auction price (e.g., if the winner of the contest is the lowest quality firm, the contest's price is lower 
than the auction price). 
lOIf the minimun quality Qis low, the outcome is similar to the auction outcome. But if the minimun quality Q 
is high, then expected quality and price of the PAA are higher than thecontest. 
10 
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sumption, te [~f~n > 0, we can show that the higher quality firm provides more welfare to the 
Administration than the lower quality one: V(Qj) - Cj < V(Q¡) - c¡. Therefore, the optimal 
mechanism undervalues quality.D 
In terms of regulation policy this result, the aboye Proposition shows that when the Adminis-
tration makes the rules for evaluating bids in the procurement process, it should assign less weight 
to quality than the optimal weight with perfect information. This implies that low quality firms 
will win the contests more often than it would be efficient. In brief, the optimal mechanism dis-
criminates in favor of the low quality firms.u The aboye result provides the same prescriptions as 
the one of Laffont and Tirole (1991).12 
The idea of Proposition 3 is straightforward: There is a trade-off between increasing expected 
quality of the project and limiting the expected profits of high quality firms. If the optimal mecha-
nism did not undervalue the quality in the bids, it would result in increasing profits of high quality 
firms, because they have more chances ofwinning, and this would lead to an increase in the expected 
price of the project13 • 
The State Contract Law also considers another procurement mechanism: the previous admis-
11 An other interesting question is: When is discrimination in favour of a low firm too high? The answer is complexo 
If the social value of quality is high and the firms are very heterogeneus, the discrimination should be low. But in 
other cases, the discrimination depends on F(c). Though we can not give a general result for this case, we can give a 
simple but interesting example. Consider the family of distribution functions F(x) = xn on (0,1). The value function 
of the optimal mechanism is in this case 1/J(Q, c) =V(Q) - c - ~,and it follows that the discrimination is decreasing 
in n. In this case the relationship between variance and optimal discrimination can be made explicito When there is 
low variance (low cost uncertainty and low competition 's profit) little discrimination should be employed. It is also 
interesting to notice that discrimination does not depend on the number of biders N. 
12This result, also goes in the way of Branco (1992) who assumes that firms also choose their quality levels. His 
result is that the optimal mechanism produces less expected quality than it would be efficient. 
13We suppose, however, that there is no relationship between a firm's cost and its quality. If on the other hand 
individual firms had different cost distributions associated with different quality levels, F¡(c), the value function of 
the optimal mechanism would be 1/J(Q, c) =V(Q¡) - c¡ - ~:f~:5 and this would imply a change of Proposition 3. 
11 
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sion contesto This kind of contest can be necessary, for example, if for specific quality levels the 
Administration is not interested in awarding the project. But with our assumptions (V(QN) > c*) 
and our definition of the contest, the Administration never wants to limit entry: if it did so, ex-
pected price would increase and expected welfare would decrease. The justifications for the use of 
this mechanism could be reducing the transaction cost (to collect information from the firms and 
study the bids) and creating a reputation mechanism. 
Reputation mechanisms become important when auctions are repeated. For this reason the 
Administration can take into the account the behavior firms had in previous projects to' make 
decisions about new ones. For example, since there are high transaction cost to prepare a complete 
contract for large infrastructure projects, costly confiict situations are likely to arise and a great 
deal of bargaining can be expected to take place between the Administration and firms during the 
realization of a project. In such a situation it could be worthwhile for the Administration to use a 
previous admission mechanism to maintain high profits for the firms and to therefore provide them 
with incentives not to enter in confiict with itself.14 
The conclusion is that to limit the competition through the previous admission mechanism 
could give firms incentives for "good behavior". 
Implementing the optimal mechanism 
Although it is simple to characterize the optimal mechanism, its practical implementation could be 
complexo In fact, the regular procurement mechanism used by the Administration in this context, is 
14The Wall Street Journal Europe (March 7,1995) reports how the German Administration limits competition in 
the Electric Turbine Market. General Electric complains that the German Electric Turbine Market is dosed, because 
they have not sold a turbine since before World War n. Disputing a simple interpretation in terms of German 
protectionism, a quoted source daimed that "a German purchaser must think about his long-term relationship with 
the supplier" . 
12 
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a first price sealed-bid auction with specific award rules. Firms submit their bids, and a contracting 
board evaluates both price and quality of the firmo The contracting board decision is based on the 
previously stated award's rules, and the awarded firm receives only its own bid. 
The aim of this section is to implement the optimal mechanism as a first price sealed-bid auction 
with specific award rules in an simplified environment. We only consider two firms, the high-quality 
firm and the low-quality firmo The social value of the quality is just the quality V(Q) =Q. The 
quality of the high-quality firm is 1 +Ll and the quality of the low- quality firm is 1. The cost 
distribution function is a uniform function on the [0,1]. The difference between the two quality 
values, is at most 1, Ll E (0,1). 
We look for a favoritism auction equivalent to the optimal mechanism. 15 The award rule 
of the optimal mechanism in this environment is 'l/J(Q, c) = Q - 2c. We are indifferent between 
the high-quality firm and the low-quality firm, when their cost are: eh +1 =C¡. If the difference 
between costs Ch - CI is greater than 1, the low-quality firm will be the awarded firm, otherwise 
the high-quality firm will be the awarded firmo 
1 
The award finn is the high-quality one 
1>":: The award finn is the low-quality one 
Cost of high-quality finn 
Cost of low-quality finn 
Relation between the award firros and the costs firros. 
The application of the auction that we are implementing is quite simple. The firms submit 
l~We will do this in a similar way to Branco(1994). 
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their bid, bh and b¡. The Administration computes the costs associated with the bids; and also 
the difference between these costs a = bb"I(Ch) - bb"I(C¡). Later on, the Administration applies the 
awarding rule. If a is higher than ~, the low-quality firm will be the awarded firm, otherwise the 
high-quality firm will be the awarded firmo 
The equilibrium bidding function for the high-quality firm is bh ( Ch) = 21::~2cA, and the bidding 
function for the low-quality firm is b¡(C¡) = max{c¡, ;~:~;t} 16. We can check that the high-
quality bidding function is greater or equal than the low-quality bidding function for every cost 
(1 A)2
The probability that the awarded firm is the high-quality one is ó* = 1 - ~, then, the 
high-quality firm has a higher probability to be awarded firm than the low-quality one. Therefore, 
the expected quality will be: Qc = (1 - ó*) +ó*(1 +~).
 
The high-quality bidding function is increasing in the difference of quality ~, ~ ~ O, but the 
low-quality bidding function is decreasing in the difference of quality ~, ~ ~ O. Moreover, the 
expected quality and the award probability of the high-quality firm , are increasing in the difference 
of quality ~ ~~ ~ O. 
The previous admission auction 
In this section we want to show the functioning of the previous admission auction. In the environ-
ment of the previous section we have only two choices; we can not set any requirement, and both 
firms can take part in the auction, or we can exclude to the low-quality firmo 
If we do not set requirement (or the requirem~nt, the minimum quality level is low Q~ 1), the 
previous admission auction is equivalent to the auction. The bidding function of an auction in this 
setup is ~. The expected price is then Pa = ~. The probability that the awarded firm is the 
16See appendix B. 
14 
-------------------------,--r--------------------
high-quality one is~, and thereíore, the expected quality is Qs = ~+ ~(1+~). The expected profits 
oí the firms are 7r: = 7r~ = ~. Finally, the Administration's expected welfare is W = ~ + ~~.s 
If we set a requirement preventing the entry oí the low quality firm 1 < Q~ 1 +~, the Admin-
istration can only award the project to the high-quality one. In this setup , the Administration's 
optimal strategy is to offer a take-Ieave offer to the high-quality firmo The behavior oí the firm in 
presence oí the offer is simple: ií the project's cost is higher than the offer, the firm reject the offer, 
in other case, the firm accept the offer. With that firm behavior, the Administration's expected 
profit is W sa = ft'''(1 +~ - Psa)dca = Psa (1 +~ - Psa )' Thereíore, the optimal Administration's 
offer is Psa = lt~. Given this offer, the expected Administration's profit is W sa = (1+4~}2. Final1y, 
the expected profit oí the high-quality firm is 7r: = (1+8~}2. 
a 
The next step is to speciíy when it is better to prevent the entry oí the low quality firm 
difference quality. The Administration's profit implies that ií the difference in quality between 
firms is ~ ~ ~' the optimal Administration's strategy is not to prevent entry, but ií the difference 
in quality between the firms is ~ < 73, the optimal Administration 's strategy is to prevent the 
entry oí the low-quality firmo When the Administration prevents the entry, the expected price, 
quality and profit oí the high-quality firm rise. 
Now, we can compare the different mechanisms that we have analyzed in terms oí the expected 
welíare oí the Administration. The main conc1usion is that the optimal mechanism is always better, 
and its advantage is higher when the difference in quality is high. 
15 
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Expected Welfare ofthe Optimal Mechanism and the PAA 
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In the figure, the optimal mechanism is the continuous line (-), and the previous admission 
auction is the point line (.). 
Concluding remarks 
If firms competing for a procurement contract are not homogeneous and have different leveIs of 
quality the optimal mechanism is an auction with "favoritism". The probability of being awarded 
a project is higher when a firm has high quality than when it has low quality. In the optimal 
mechanism's value function, however, quality is undervalued. Thus, while higher quality firms are 
awarded the contract with higher probability, the optimal mechanism discriminates in favor of low 
quality firms, and these firms get the contract more often than it would be efficient with perfect 
information. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
We first want to guarantee that the mechanism is incentive compatible. If the firm's expected profit 
is 'Ir = EC_ i [P( C', C-i) - CiXi( C', C-i)], the envelope theorem implies that: 
We want to replace a global incentive compatibility constraint for a local constraint. Fol1owing 
Guesnerie and Laffont (1984), we must prove that the mechanism satisfies the Spence-Mirrlees 
condition tc (~; /~;) = -1 and that the probability of awarding is monotonical1y decreasing in 
cost 8~i EC _ i [Xi( Ci, C-i)] :s O. We will omit this second condition until the end of the proof. 
The incentive constraint implies that the firm's' profit is decreasing in Ci, Thus we must show 
only that the highest cost firm c" gets positive profit. Replacing Pi for 'Ir + XiCi in the objective 
function we get: 
N N N]
w E [t; V(Qi)Xi - t; XiCi - t; 'lri 
E [t;NV( Qi)Xi - N] - t;N EC _ i [C'1. 'lrif(Ci)dci]t; XiCi 
Integrating by parts and using ~~ =- EC _ i [Xi( C', C-i)] we obtain: 
N N] N [ c. ]
W = E [~V(Qi)Xi - ~XiCi - ~EC_i ['lriF(c)]~: +1. Xi(Ci,C-i)F(Ci)dci . 
Since the objective function is decreasing in 'lri, 'and the individual rationality condition implies 
'lri(c") = O, the highest cost firm gets Oprofits independent of its quality, and therefore ['lriF( C)]~~ = 
O. Given this we can now simplify the objective function aboye. Multiplying and dividing by the 
density function f(c), we obtain: 
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N N N F(C')]
W =E [?= V(Q¡)X¡ - ?= X¡C¡ - ?= X¡ f(c~) 
1=1 1=1 1=1 I 
Defining the value function 7/J(Q,c) as 7/J(Q¡,C¡) =V(Q¡) - Ci - ~(~:?' the objective function is: 
W = E [t 7/J(Q¡,C¡)X¡] 
1=1 
and it follows than the Administration must choose the lowest 7/J(Qi, C¡). 
1 if 7/J(Q¡,C¡) =maxj7/J(Qj,Cj)
X¡( C¡, C-¡) = 
{ O otherwise 
Given this awarding rule and using the monotone hazard rate assumption tc [~{~?] > O, we can 
show that the monotonici ty condition 8~¡ EC_ i x [¡ (C¡, C-i)] ~ Ois satisfied. 
We must now define the expected payment. Given p¡ = ll'+C¡X¡ and using ~ = -EC_ i [X¡(c', c-¡)],we 
obtain: 
c' 
Pi = C¡X¡(C¡, C_¡) +¡ X¡(s, c-i)ds. 
C¡ 
Let i* be the best firm different from i, 7/J(Q¡" Ci') ~ 7/J(Qj, Cj), Vj l' i. If 7/J(Q¡', Ci') ~ 7/J(Q¡, C¡) and 
7/J(Qi,C*) < 7/J(Q¡"Ci'), we define the cost with which firm i has the same valuation as i*, c~
 
7/J(Q¡,c~) = maxj 7/J(Qj,Cj) Vj l' i. Now using the definition of Xi, the payment is: 
c* if 7/J(Qi,C*) ~ 7/J(Q¡"C¡')
p'-
I - { C~ : 7/J(Q¡, C~) = 7/J(Q¡" C¡,) if 7/J(Q¡, c*) < 7/J(Q¡" Ci') 
The payment is Oif the firm does not get the contract while if it does, the payment is equal to the 
maximum cost with which the firm would have b~en awarded the project.D 
Appendix B 
The goal of this appendix is characterize the equilibrium bids of the first sealed bid auctions 
equivalent to the optimal mechanism. 
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The bid of the high-quality firm is found as the solution of this simple maximization problem: 
The first order condition is: 
The solution of this differential equation with the initial condition b(1) = 1, is: 
The problem of the low-quality firm is the same. Thus, the bid of the low-quality firm is found 
as the solution of this maximization problem: 
The first order condition is: 
The solution of this differential equation with the initial condition b(l) = 1, is: 
This bid is wrong if Cb > 1 - ~' because the firm can not win the auction, and with this bid, 
the firm will not get positive profits. We must guarantee that the low quality firm do not obtain 
negative profits. Taking this into account, the bid is: 
19 
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